According to spatial models of elections, citizen perceptions of party policy positions are a key determinant of voting choices. Yet recent scholarship reports evidence that party campaign stances fail to reshape voter beliefs about party positions. We argue that leader changes enable parties, particularly those in opposition, to redefine their ideological image as new leaders attract more media attention and signal that the party may have revised its policy views. Focusing on Western European parties in the 1979-2012 period, we show that having a new leader is a necessary condition for voters to update their perceptions of opposition parties' left-right placements. Platforms are irrelevant for governing parties regardless of whether the leader is veteran or new, however, suggesting that voters rely on incumbent behavior rather than rhetoric.
When Tony Blair took over the leadership of the British Labour Party in 1994, he inherited a party that had been incapable of breaking the electoral domination of the British Conservatives for about fifteen years. The Labour party was widely perceived as too leftist to be able to attract enough support to defeat the incumbent Tories, and this was despite all the effort of Neil Kinnock -Labour leader between 1983 and 1992-to moderate the party position (Heath et al. 1994; Smith 1994) . Even if voter perceptions were also moderating alongside with the party's position (Adams et al. 2012a, b) , they did so at a much slower pace. It was not until the election of Tony Blair that Labour's appeals to centrist voters resonated in the electorate. Recast as a leftof-center party, Labour obtained a sweeping victory in the 1997 election.
In this paper, we analyze whether appointing a new leader empowers political parties to change the attitudes and beliefs that voters have about the party. Specifically, we examine whether, following a leadership change, the policy stances that parties take during an election campaign have a stronger impact on voter perceptions of the party's ideology. This paper builds on recent scholarship showing that the role of campaign messages in shaping voter perceptions of party policy positions is null (Adams et al. 2011) or limited (Fernandez-Vazquez 2014) . We address these findings by arguing that parties under a new leader -the most important political actor in modern day political parties (Poguntke and Webb 2000)-are in a better position to influence public perceptions with their campaign messages. First, the process by which the former leader is ousted and the new one is appointed tends to intensify the media coverage of the party, thereby increasing citizens' exposure and attention to the party's messages. Second, not only do people pay more attention to the party and hear more about the party position, but also they are more likely to hear the message directly from the party. Since rival parties may frame a party's position differently (Lupia and McCubbins 1998) , hearing the message from the party itself reduces the noise and offers more accurate information on the party's policy stances. Finally, the leadership transition provides a hint to voters that the party may be changing its ideological views. As a result, voters become more open to update their judgments about the party in the subsequent election campaign when the party announces its policy proposals. While policy change under the old leadership is more likely to be evaluated as opportunistic, a new position under a new leader is taken as more credible and acceptable.
We also expect these effects to be stronger for opposition parties. Incumbents are evaluated mainly based on their performance in office, and hence voter perceptions of governing parties' position reflect more what these parties do in office rather than what they promise they will do during the election campaign Cho and Endersby 2003) .
Opposition parties' campaign stances, on the other hand, have a larger impact on voter beliefs.
Hence, we argue that the effect of new leaders on voter perceptions is stronger for opposition parties compared to incumbent parties.
In order to evaluate these hypotheses, we examine the relationship between the left-right tone of party election manifestos and voter perceptions of party positions in seven Western European democracies during the period . 1 We test whether the strength of such relationship hinges on whether the party is running under a new leadership or not using original data on party leader changes. 1 Such geographical and historical scope is very similar to that adopted in Adams et al. (2011) The empirical evidence shows supports for our argument. Only after a leader change do voters update their perceptions of opposition parties in line with what the party is advocating in its election platform, as voters ignore these statements of parties led by a veteran leader. On the other hand, election platforms are not consequential for the left-right image of governing parties, regardless of whether the leader is new or veteran, since voters seem to take their cues from incumbent behavior rather than rhetoric. These findings help make sense of the small or null average effects of election platforms identified in Adams et al. (2011) and Fernandez-Vazquez (2014) . Our paper reveals that such findings mask an important heterogeneity: while election campaigns play an important role in shaping perceptions of opposition parties with new leaders, campaign platforms become irrelevant with a veteran party leader.
These results also have important implications for the functioning of representative democracy, for political parties, and for the political behavior and election campaign literatures.
Election campaigns are supposed to provide an opportunity for political parties to publicly announce the policies they would promote if elected for office. The intended goal is to allow voters to learn about party positions so that they can cast their votes for those parties that closely represent their interests (see the Responsible Party Model, APSA 1950). Otherwise, if voter perceptions are not in line with what parties intend to do as incumbents, their capacity to select politicians based on their policy positions is weakened, thereby depressing the quality of representation (see also Aldrich et al. 2011; Bartels 1996; Lupia and McCubbins 1998; van der Brug 1997) . While the extant literature has provided a skeptical view of the capacity of campaigns to change voter beliefs about party, we show that, after a leadership transition, party campaign messages are able to reshape voter perceptions about opposition parties.
Our findings also have implications for our understanding of the dynamics of party competition. If a policy shift announced during a campaign does not lead voters to revise their perception of what the party stands for, then political parties cannot successfully signal a change in their policy views. In this case, a party that needs to redefine its ideological reputation in order to increase its electoral appeal will have a hard time using its campaign rhetoric to rebrand itself.
Our findings suggest that it is only under a new party leader that voters are willing to update their perception of party positions. Hence, for a party to be able to reshape its policy image, i.e. to persuade voters that it has moved in the policy space, it may need to replace its party leader first.
Last but not least, these results contribute to party organization, election campaigning and political behavior literatures by showing how party organizational changes affect the reception of the party message by voters. While the findings in the literature are mixed on whether party messages and behavior can affect voter perceptions (Adams et al. 2011; Fernandez-Vazquez 2014; Fortunato and Stevenson 2013) , we show that new party leaders can influence perceptions by increasing the attention to the party and helping the voters hear the party message directly.
Party Leadership Changes and Voter Perceptions
Existing evidence on whether voters listen to parties is bleak. Adams et al. (2011 Adams et al. ( , 2014 show that voters do not update their perceptions of party positions in response to shifts in party manifestos, and Fernandez-Vazquez (2014) reports only weak effects of election platforms on voter perceptions.
There are three main reasons for why parties may struggle to redefine their policy image during a campaign (Adams et al. 2011) . First, voters are generally uninterested in politics and do not pay too much attention to party messages (e.g., Converse 1964; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996) . Therefore, despite parties' campaign rhetoric, voters may not be aware of party policy shifts and not update their perceptions of party positions. Second, rival parties can -intentionally or unintentionally-distort the party's message by providing an alternative view of the focal party's policy stances, and discredit the party's message by depicting it as opportunistic or insincere (e.g., Lupia and McCubbins 1998) . Third, voters may be generally skeptical of party rhetoric, expect it to be motivated by short-term electoral incentives, and therefore discount campaign messages as not credible (Banks 1990; Callander and Wilkie 2007; FernandezVazquez 2015) ,
We argue that party leadership changes counteract these mechanisms and increase voter awareness and knowledge about party positions by (1) increasing voter exposure to parties, (2) by providing a better access to the direct message from parties themselves rather than the mediated message by other parties, and (3) by credibly convincing voters about parties' new policy positions. In what follows, we elaborate on each of these points in more detail.
Since party leaders are among the most influential political actors in parliamentary democracies, a leadership change tends to receive heightened attention from the media (Gomibuchi 2001) . The resignation or removal of the previous leader, the contest for control of the party and the rhetoric of the politician that carries the leadership election attracts the spotlight of media outlets. Such increased media coverage of the leadership transition enhances citizens' exposure to the party and to its policies. As Zaller (1992) argues, as the volume of the message increases, more people are likely to hear it and more frequently. When more people hear about party positions and are exposed to the party message over and over again, it is more likely that voters on average will be able to update their perceptions of party positions. This is also consistent with what the extensive literature on campaign effects and voter learning suggests. As Such exposure also makes it easier for voters to hear the message directly from the party itself rather than in a mediated form via rival parties' framing of these messages. Hearing the message directly from the party helps voters accurately update their perceptions of party positions. When voters rely on indirect, mediated, and distorted messages, on the other hand, it is likely that they either hear the distorted message and misperceive the party's position, or ignore the message and rely on their prior knowledge and beliefs (Lupia and McCubbins 1998; Popkin 1991) , which are likely to be different than the party's rhetoric. Hence, our argument builds on the heuristic-based literature, which posits that people use information shortcuts in order to form opinions about politics (Lupia and McCubbins 1998; Popkin 1991) , and further argues that the messages that voters hear directly from the party help voters develop more accurate perceptions of party positions. Since a leadership change facilitates this direct information mechanism between the party and voters by increasing the availability and the volume of information about the party, we expect to see voters to be more informed about party campaign positions following a leadership transition.
Beyond the directness and the volume of the message, we also argue that voters find policy shifts more credible under a new leader. A party that campaigns on new policy positions runs the risk of being accused of opportunism and flip-flopping by rival parties and the media (Somer-Topcu, 2009a To sum up, we argue that, after a leadership change, voters are more likely to respond to the party's campaign messages and revise their perceptions accordingly. When parties change their leaders the coverage of the party increases in the media, which heightens voter attention and exposure to the party's direct campaign message. Not only do the volume and the directness of the message increase under a new leader, but also campaign stances are considered to be more credible, and therefore we expect voters to better understand the party positions. Hence, the first observable implication of our argument is the following:
H1: New party leaders help voters update their perceptions of party positions in line with the public stances taken by the party.
While we expect voters to know and update their perceptions more about parties with new leaders, we also expect this effect to be stronger for opposition parties. Parties that are out of office rely mainly on campaign rhetoric to redefine their policy image and can do it more successfully compared to governing parties. Incumbents, on the contrary, are often evaluated based on their performance in office and thus find shifting their policy positions more difficult (Cho and Endersby 2003) . They can only redefine their ideological reputation through other means, like the choice of coalition partners (Fortunato and Stevenson 2013) , their legislative record (Grynaviski 2010) or the orientation of the policies promoted in office (Lupu 2014) . As
Adams (2012) 
Research Design
To examine our hypotheses we analyze how voters develop perceptions about party positions in response to party campaign messages. We will consider party positions primarily on the left-right dimension. According to Downs (1957) , voters mainly gather information about parties along a left-right continuum and electoral competition takes place on that dimension.
Even today, policies are still frequently described in terms of a left-right mapping by political commentators, scholars, and parties alike. The left-right axis is an 'ideological super-issue' that summarizes positions on several key policy domains (Pierce 1999; McDonald and Budge 2005) .
As such, research has shown that the left-right dimension is still useful to understand the structure of party competition in European democracies (Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 2006; van der Brug et al. 2005) . (Hooghe et al. 2002; van der Eijk and Niemoeller 1983) . 3 The supporting information to this article shows the list of all surveys we use as our data sources.
The countries and time periods covered in our dataset are those in which election studies have consistently asked respondents to place political parties on such a left-right scale. In each case, we have computed the average placement given to each political party as our measure of perceived left-right position. We therefore have data on the ideological image of all relevant political parties in every country after each parliamentary election.
We define party campaign messages as the policy proposals that parties make in their election manifestos. Party manifestos are written documents that parties publish in the run up to an election stating the policies that the party promises to pursue if elected for office. In European and Westminster democracies, manifestos become the basis of both party competition during elections (Budge et al. 2001 ) and party policy programs in office (Gallagher et al. 2006; Mansergh and Thomson 2007) . They reflect revealed positions based on which the parties actually compete during elections. Party elites on the ground agree that their election manifestos constitute the basis for their electoral campaign and significantly shape the electoral the data by mapping "1" on the original scale to "0" in the new scale. For the intermediate values ---2 to 9---, we have applied the following rescaling function: new_scale= (old_scale -1)*(10/9 ) competition (Somer-Topcu 2009a).
5 It is therefore essential to try to understand whether voters make sense of these policy pledges. categories. The rile scaling, however, has been criticized for yielding estimates that are biased towards the center . For that reason, here we employ 5 Adams, Ezrow, and Somer-Topcu (2011) report interviews that Somer-Topcu (2009a) conducted with party elites (party leaders, members of parliament, campaign directors, and directors of party think tank organizations) from Germany, the Netherlands, and Austria. The evidence from these interviews confirmed the centrality of manifestos for party campaigns and elections.
the alternative scaling of the original Manifesto Project data proposed by Lowe et al. (2011). 7 This estimate is computed by taking the log of the ratio of left and right sentences. We have rescaled these logit estimates so that they also take values on a 0-10 scale.
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We have also collected original leadership change data in the same seven Western
European countries. The leadership change information has been obtained using Keesing's World Archives, secondary literature, and online newspaper archives. Who is perceived as the party leader varies from country to country and even from party to party within the same country.
To give an example, we code the changes in the parliamentary leaders of the Conservative, Labour, and Liberal Democratic parties in Britain as official leadership changes. On the other hand, the extraparliamentary party chairperson is identified as the party leader for the Christian Democrats and Social Democrats in Germany, while the parliamentary leader is coded as the head of the party for the German liberals (FDP). The decision on who we should code as the leader of each party is taken based on an extensive reading of the literature and, in some instances, in consultation with country experts. We coded leadership changes as a dummy 7 In the supplementary information, we replicate our results using the original Manifesto Project left-right scaling -rile- as well as the one proposed by . Finally, in order to test hypothesis 2, we have coded a dummy variable indicating the governing status of each political party. We define as incumbent any political party that has been part of the cabinet at any point between the current parliamentary election and the previous one.
To give an example of our coding criterion, we consider the Swedish Moderate party to be an campaign (platform it ) and previous experiences with the party summarized in its pre-election ideological image (voter_perceptions i,t-1 ). Modeling evaluations as a combination of memory and new information is common in studies of public opinion change (e.g. Bartels 1993 Bartels , 2002 Erikson et al. 2002) . According to the logic of this approach, the more relevant campaigns are for voter perceptions, the lesser the role of prior notions about the party. We can thus define two opposite scenarios. First, if perceptions are fully explained by what parties advocate in the campaign, the coefficient for platform it should equal 1 and that for voter_perceptions i,t-1 should be 0. Conversely, if party rhetoric has no effect on voter attitudes, we should find that the coefficient for platform it is 0 and that for voter_perceptions i,t-1 is 1 .
Our main hypothesis states that the above relationship is conditional on party leadership change. That is, when there is a new leader, we should observe a substantively and statistically stronger relationship between the party message and voter perceptions. In order to determine whether a change in the party leadership empowers the party to change its ideological image, we estimate the following interactive model: we hypothesize that b 5 will be negative. At the same time, since our argument does not make predictions about whether the leader change itself reveals any information about the party, we do not formulate claims about b 6 . As a corollary to our argument, hypothesis 2 implies that new party leaders are more consequential for parties in opposition than for incumbents. Hence, the interactive model in equation 2 is not only estimated for the full sample but also separately for the subsamples of governing and opposition parties. Table 1 implies that the party left-right image that emerges after the campaign is largely driven by the initial voter beliefs. In sum, these results would suggest that election campaigns have a statistically significant but substantively small effect on party left-right images, which is consistent with previous findings (Fernandez-Vazquez 2014 ).
Empirical Results
Yet such a small average impact of party campaigns may be masking a considerable degree of heterogeneity depending on whether the party has recently renewed its leadership or not. According to our first hypothesis, following a leader change the policy stances that the party takes are more relevant for voter perceptions of the party's position. In order to test this claim, we estimate equation 2, which specifies an interaction between the content of manifestos and an indicator of whether the party leader has been replaced since the previous election. These estimates are displayed in the second column of Table 1 .
The coefficient for platform and that of voter perceptions (t-1) denote, respectively, the effect of campaign messages and the inertia in voter perceptions when the party leader has stayed the same since the last election. If a new politician is heading the party, the influence of election platforms is defined by the sum of the coefficients for platform and platform X leader change, while the stability in voter perceptions obtains by adding the voter perceptions (t-1) and the voter perceptions (t-1) X leader change parameters. In line with our argument, we expect the interaction coefficient platform X leader change to be positive and that for voter perceptions (t-1) X leader change to be negative. Coefficient estimates for the full sample show that campaign positions do not change voter perceptions of parties with veteran leaders. The impact of election manifestos is very small, 0.05, and it is not statistically different from 0. As a mirror image, the high coefficient for the lagged voter perception, 0.93, indicates that voter perceptions before and after the election are essentially the same. In line with our first hypothesis, the interaction coefficients with leader change have the expected sign and would therefore suggest that, under a new leader, the influence of party rhetoric increases and the degree of inertia in voter perceptions decreases.
Such differences are not statistically significant, however. What is more, these results provide evidence that a leadership change is a necessary condition for voters to update their views in line with the party's policy promises. This can be most clearly seen in the marginal effects presented in Table 2 . When a veteran leader heads the party, the estimated effect of election platforms is essentially zero (-0.001), suggesting that in this scenario campaign pronouncements have no effect on voter perceptions. By the same token, inertia in perceptions is very high (0.98) and indeed such marginal effect is not statistically distinguishable from 1. As noted in the previous section, that is precisely the benchmark case where voter perceptions after the election are the same in expectation as the pre-campaign ones.
In contrast, a new leader is able to reshape the party's left-right reputation: even though voter perceptions are still relatively sticky -the marginal effect of the prior perception is 0.84-, party campaigns have a substantial effect on where voters locate the party on a left-right scale -the marginal effect is 0.22-. We can illustrate these results with the following example. According to our estimates, if a party perceived to be located at 6 proposes policies considered to be at 7, voter perceptions will shift to 6.38 under a new leader but only to 6.03 if the leader has not changed, and the latter shift is not statistically different from 0. or with new leaders.
Ruling Out Alternative Explanations
As a further test of our argument that replacing the party leader increases the probability that voters will listen to the party's policy proposals and update their perceptions accordingly, we check whether the empirical patterns we identify can be explained by alternative theoretical mechanisms. One such alternative story could be that having a new leader is not per se what enhances the capacity of parties to change their left-right reputations, but the fact that leadership transitions correlate with larger shifts in party policy stances, which are more likely to be covered by the mass media and therefore reach a wider segment of the electorate. In order to evaluate this alternative explanation, we test whether it is indeed the case that shifts in the leftright tone between the party manifestos at election t and t-1 are larger once the party has appointed a new leader. Table 3 reports a difference in means test comparing the policy shifts that parties engage in with and without a leader replacement. It shows that the average size of manifesto left-right shifts is not statistically different between parties with stable leadership or a new one. In fact, the point estimate for the mean policy shift is lower for parties with new leaders.
This test therefore indicates that the increased effectiveness of party campaigns following a leader change is not due to a concurrent rise in the magnitude of party policy shifts. A second alternative account posits that new leaders want to imprint the party's policy rhetoric with their own policy preferences and therefore favor elaborating less ambiguous party manifestos. This could then help voters identify that the party is changing its ideological commitments and adjust their perceptions. We evaluate the empirical support for this theoretical story by testing whether manifesto left-right positions can be estimated with less uncertainty once a new party official has taken over the leadership. For that purpose we make use of the measurement error estimates in party platform positions computed by . 11 Table Table 4 
Supporting Information
The following supporting information presents detailed descriptions of the data and its sources, and introduces several robustness checks. The structure of this section is the following:
1. List of countries, time-periods and political parties included in the empirical analyses.
2. Robustness check. Using alternative estimates of manifesto left-right positions.
3. Robustness check. Taking into account the presence of measurement error in estimates of manifesto left-right positions.
4. Robustness check. Employing an alternative indicator of whether a party is in office or not. Table 5 lists the countries, time periods and political parties that we have included in the empirical analyses: Table 6 includes summary statistics of the data used in the empirical models: In government 0.4 0.5 0 1 234 Table 7 lists the sources for the post-election surveys that we have collected in order to estimate the average left-right placement attributed to each political party after the campaign: To make sure that our results do not hinge on the specific scaling of manifesto position that we use , we have tested our argument using alternative estimates of manifesto left-right orientations. Table 8 presents the empirical results using the original CMP measure of left-right positions . These results do not substantially differ from the ones obtained using Lowe et al.'s scaling procedure: whereas election manifestos do not shape voter perceptions of incumbent parties no matter whether the party leader is new or "old", parties in opposition need to change their leader if they want voters to update their perceptions in line with the party's campaign. In fact, in the latter case, the left-right placement given to a political party with a veteran leader doesn't change as a result of the campaign: the marginal effect of the lagged perception is undistinguishable from 1 -the point estimate is 0.99-and the effect of the manifesto is essentially 0 -point estimate is -0.02 -. Under a new leader, in contrast, the effect of manifestos increases to 0.26 and the degree of inertia drops to 0.85. Table 9 replicates the analysis using estimates of manifesto leftright positions. Again, these results reproduce the same empirical pattern reported above.
1) Overview of the data used in the empirical analyses
Leadership transitions do not condition the impact of election manifestos for incumbent parties, as in these cases voters seem to use alternative cues to form their beliefs about party left-right positions. For parties out of office, on the other hand, running under a new party leader is a necessary condition to convince voters that the party has shifted its policy preferences. Table 10 presents simex estimates for both governing and opposition parties. The substantive conclusion that emerges is identical to the one drawn in the "standard" regression analyses.
While leader transitions do not influence the effectiveness of incumbent party manifestos, they are a necessary condition for parties in opposition to redefine their left-right image in the campaign. Note: The dependent variable in these models is the average voter perception of the party left-right position after the election campaign as measured in post-election surveys. We use jackknife standard errors in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
4) Replicating the interactive model adopting a more restrictive definition of incumbency status.
The empirical estimates in Table 11 rely on a classification of incumbent and opposition parties according to the following criterion: governing parties are those that are part of the last cabinet before the parliamentary election. Using this more restrictive definition of incumbency does not challenge our main substantive conclusion: while leader changes are not relevant for incumbent parties, they decisively condition the impact of election manifestos for opposition parties. Note: The dependent variable in these models are the voter perceptions of the party left-right position after the election campaign using the post-election surveys. We use party clustered standard errors in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
